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ARGUMENT
1.

DEFENDANT, IN THE COURSE OF MEETING HIS BURDEN OF
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, HAS SHOWN THAT EVEN WHEN THE
EVIDENCE IS VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
JURY'S VERDICT, IT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF BURGLARY AS A PARTY.

When

challenging

the

sufficiency

of

the

evidence,

a

" Md] efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient•'"
v. Hayes,

860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State

840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah App. 1992), cert,

denied,

v.

State
Vigil,

857 P.2d 948 (Utah

1993) ) . Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the
verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and then persuade the
appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the State failed to
prove that he was a party to the burglary of the Kjar residence.
State

v. Scheel,
In

See

823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991).

its Brief, the State argues that Defendant

adequately marshal

the evidence

failed to

(Brief of Appellee, pp. 8-9) .

However, as is set forth in his Brief (see Brief of Appellant, pp.
13-19) ,

Appellant

supporting

the

specifically

verdict.

marshals

all

of

the

evidence

After doing so, Defendant shows that the

evidence at trial was woefully short of that required to support a
reasonable inference that Defendant had either the mental state or
the required conduct, as set forth by statute, for conviction of
burglary as

a party.

Appellant, pp. 17-19.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202; Brief of

In the course of its argument, the State
3

claims that Defendant omitted five critical facts when marshaling the
evidence.

These facts, rather than supporting the verdict, actually,

when reviewed more closely, support Defendant's position concerning
the insufficiency of the evidence.1

*The State argues that Defendant omitted the five following
facts: (1) the incorrect address on the pawn cards; (2) that
Defendant stated that he purchased a guitar from a friend for $5.00,
which was valued at approximately $250; (3) that Defendant later
stated that he did not know the guitar had been stolen; (4) that
Defendant then said that a "friend" had committed the burglary, and
that he only pawned the items as a favor; and (5) that Defendant
failed to identify his friend when charged.
The address contained on the pawn card referred to in fact
number one is an address that is basically the same address as that
where Defendant, just a short time before, lived (R. 243-44, Trial
Transcript). In fact, the address volunteered by Defendant on the
card is only one number different from the correct address
(Id.).
Defendant mistakenly listed the address as "250 East" instead of "200
East", where he lived with his brother and sister-in-law for a short
time (Id.).
If Defendant indeed wanted to provide a false address,
he would not have provided an address so close to his brother's
home
where he previously lived.
Facts two, three, and four advanced by the State are completely
consistent with Defendant's position, consistently maintained since
charges were filed, that a friend had committed the burglary, and
that he simply pawned the items as a favor (R. 250-51, Trial
Transcript).
In its discussion of fact number four, the State
confusingly presents Defendant's explanation to his sister-in-law
about the pawned items elicited by way of her testimony at trial so
as to advance what it propounds is an inconsistency in Defendant's
explanation of his knowledge of the burglary. As set forth in his
sister-in-law's testimony, the telephone conversation between
Defendant and herself took place approximately one or two months
prior to trial (R. 250, lines 11-18, Trial Transcript). Because at
the time of the conversation Defendant knew of the burglary charges
against him, he simply told his sister-in-law that he "didn't realize
that the guitar was stolen" when he pawned the items (R. 250-51,
Trial Transcript).
Finally, contrary to the State's argument
concerning fact number five, simply because Defendant does not reveal
the identity of his friend to the police, does not create an
inference that he was a party to the burglary. The aforementioned
facts, when taken together, emphasize the consistency of Defendant's
explanation of his possession of the stolen items.
4

Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary, as
set forth at pages 15-17 of the Brief of Appellant pursuant to the
marshaling requirement, is viewed is a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, it is insufficient to support Defendant's conviction
of burglary as

a party.

The evidence, even when so viewed, is

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.

Such a reasonable

doubt is evidenced by the jury's written communication with the trial
court during its deliberations. The note from the jury stated, "What
does

%

party' mean in regards to when a person became aware of a

crime?

Is a person a "party" to burglary if they are aware of the

crime after it was committed, or do they have to be aware of it
before hand?

Or during?

Help" (R. 86) (emphasis included).

As set forth in it's Brief, the State's case hinges on the
inferences to be drawn from Defendant's close proximity to the Kjar
residence by way of his construction work at the Kjar home around the
time of the burglary, and that Defendant, shortly after the burglary,
pawned a portion of the stolen property.2

These events, taken

together with the other evidence marshaled above, establish no
probative inference that Defendant, as a party to the burglary, acted
with the same mental state as the person who entered or remained

2

Cf. State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1986) (holding
that "[t]he mere possession of stolen property unexplained by the
person in charge thereof is not in and of itself sufficient to
justify a conviction of larceny of the property . . . . " )
5

unlawfully in the residence and solicited, requested, commanded,
encouraged,

or

intentionally

aided

the person

in

entering

or

unlawfully remaining in the Kjar residence with intent to commit
theft.

"Criminal

convictions

cannot

rest

on

conjecture

or

supposition; they must be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."

See State

v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993) (noting

that the State's argument that "speculative inferences can constitute
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred
constitutional safeguards at its core").

2.

BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL'S ACTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ACTIVE, AS OPPOSED TO A PASSIVE, WAIVER OF AN
OBJECTION, THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE TRIAL
COURT'S ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY UNDER PLAIN
ERROR TO AVOID MANIFEST INJUSTICE.

The State argues that the failure to object to the instruction
precludes appellate review.

See Brief of Appellee, pp.

18-20.

By

so arguing, the State fails to recognize that trial counsel's actions
did not constitute an active representation that there was no
objection to clarify the instruction in response to the jury's
inquiry for clarification.
The Utah Supreme Court, in State

v. Medina,

738 P.2d 1021 (Utah

1987) , declined to review a challenge to a jury instruction under the
manifest or plain error exception.

In that case, trial counsel

"actively represented to the court that she had read the instruction
and had no objection to it . . ." and thereby "consciously chose not
to assert any objection that might have been raised and affirmatively
6

led the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong with the
instruction."
In State

Id.

at 1023.3

v. Bullock,

791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), the supreme court

declined to review a challenge under plain error concerning trial
counsel's failure to seek exclusion of testimony at trial. The basis
for declining to review the challenge was based upon the conscious
strategy to challenge the quality rather than the admissibility of
the State's evidence.

Such a consciously chosen strategy was

evidenced, among other things, by trial counsel's cross-examination
of the State's witnesses and presentment of countervailing testimony
of defense experts.

Id.

at 160.

In the course of its ruling, the

supreme court stated:
The plain error rule permits the appellate court
to assure that justice is done, even if counsel
fails to act to bring a harmfully erroneous
ruling to the attention of the trial court. But
if a party through counsel has made a conscious
decision to refrain from objecting or has led
the trial court into error, we will then decline
to save that party from the error.
This
flexibility is inherent in the plain error rule.
"[T]he plain error . . . test . . . ultimately
permit[s] the appellate court to balance the
need for procedural regularity with the demands
of fairness."
Id.

at 158 (quoting State
In

the

instant

v. Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989)).

case, trial counsel, prior

3

to the jury's

5ee also State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 1995),
where this Court declined to review a jury instruction challenge
under the manifest injustice exception because trial counsel agreed
that the instruction was a correct statement of the law and did not
specifically object to the instruction, but merely offered an
alternative.
7

deliberations, did not object to the instructions utilized to
instruct the jury about the requirements of convicting Defendant as
a party to burglary.

Further, during the in-chambers conference

concerning the note received from the jury, in which Defendant was
not present, trial counsel merely said "alright" when the trial court
confusingly suggested that the jury be referred to Jury Instruction
No. 22, the same instruction with which they had been previously
instructed.4

This is the same instruction given to the jury prior to

its deliberations and its note5 to the trial court, which was sent
shortly after deliberations began, in which the jury sought guidance
from the court as to what is required in terms of a person's
awareness to be guilty of burglary as a party.

The jury's note

evidences the doubts entertained by the jury about imposing criminal
liability

as a party

in the

instant

case where

the

evidence

consistently shows, at the very most, that Defendant was not aware of

4

In the course of the in-chambers conference with counsel, the
trial court initially recognized the instructions as inadequate to
answer the jury's question (R. 349, line 3, Trial Transcript). The
trial court then merely referred the jury to the previously utilized
Jury Instruction No. 22, which states: "You are instructed that in
every crime or public offense, there must be a union or joint
operation of the act or intent (R. 86-87) . As support for the trial
court's use of the language in Jury Instruction No. 22, the State
cites State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982) . Maestas, however,
had absolutely nothing to do with party liability for the conduct of
another.
5

Shortly after the jury began its deliberations, the trial court
received the following note from the jury: "What does "party" mean
in regards to when a person became aware of a crime? Is a person a
"party" to burglary if they are aware of the crime after it was
committed, or do they have to be aware of it before hand [sic]? Or
during? Help" (R. 86) (emphasis included).

8

the burglary until after the burglary had been committed.

Such

evidence is not enough to impose criminal liability as a party under
§ 76-2-202.

By failing to instruct the jury that one cannot be

convicted as a party of burglary if that person is not aware of the
conduct that constitutes the burglary until after it is committed,
the trial court breached its duty to instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the facts of the case. See State
232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing
1981)).

State

v. Potter,

v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d

627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah

The trial court's failure is especially troubling when

considered in light of the trial court's own acknowledgment that the
instructions were inadequate to answer the jury's question and the
trial court's confusion about party liability under Utah law as
evidenced by the in-chambers conference

(See

R.

348-50, Trial

Transcript).
The instant case, in light of the aforementioned circumstances,
is particularly

compelling

injustice doctrine.

for applying

the plain or manifest

Such circumstances not only warrant review by

way of the plain error or manifest injustice doctrine but they also
warrant reversal of Defendant's conviction of burglary as a party.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court reverse Defendant's conviction of burglary and remand the case
for a new trial with instructions to correct the errors committed in
the course of his trial.

9

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant

requests

oral

argument

because

oral

argument

will

materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
issues in the instant appeal dealing with principles concerning
sufficiency

of

evidence, circumstantial

evidence,

and what

is

required for conviction as a party to a crime, which are matters of
continuing public interest and which involve issues requiring further
development in the area of criminal law case development.

Counsel

for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official
Publication" for purposes of precedential value and instruction in
future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 1997.
>LD & WIGGINS, L.C.

rL

Wigquns
Defendant§~cor Defendant
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